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Advances in the Theory of Argumentation
Schemes and Critical Questions
DAVID M. GODDEN AND
DOUGLAS WALTON
Abstract: This paper begins a workingthrough of Blair’s (2001) theoretical agenda
concerning argumentation schemes and their
attendant critical questions, in which we
propose a number of solutions to some
outstanding theoretical issues. We consider
the classification of schemes, their ultimate
nature, their role in argument reconstruction,
their foundation as normative categories of
argument, and the evaluative role of critical
questions.We demonstrate the role of
schemes in argument reconstruction, and
defend a normative account of their nature
against specific criticisms due to Pinto
(2001). Concerning critical questions, we
propose an account on which they are
founded in the R.S.A. cogency standard, and
develop an account of the relationship
between critical questions and burden of
proof. Our ultimate aim is to initiate a
reconciliation between dialectical and
informal logic approaches to the schemes.

University of Windsor
University of Winnipeg
Résumé: Dans cet article nous examinons
le projet théorique de Blair (2001) et les
questions critiques qui en découlent, et
nous proposons quelques solutions aux
problèmes théoriques saillants. Nous
réfléchissons sur la classification des
schèmes, leur nature fondamentale, leur
rôle dans la reconstruction des arguments,
leur fondement lorsqu’on les emploie
comme catégories normatives des arguments, ainsi que le rôle évaluatif des
questions critiques. Nous démontrons le
rôle des schèmes dans la reconstruction
des arguments, et défendons une explication normative de leur nature contre des
critiques de Pinto (2001). Nous fondons
les questions critiques sur les critères de
pertinence, d’acceptabilité et de suffisance,
et décrivons la relation entre les questions
critiques et la charge de preuve. Notre but
final est d’initier une réconciliation entre
les approches de la dialectique et de la
logique non formelle sur les schèmes.

Keywords: argumentation schemes, burden of proof, critical questions, defeasible
reasoning, heuristics, models of dialogue, cogency, R.S.A. criteria

1. Introduction
Argumentation schemes1 are stereotypical patterns of defeasible reasoning that
typically occur in common, everyday arguments (Blair, 1999, 2000; Walton, 1990a).2
Standard accounts of argumentation schemes describe them as representing
© Informal Logic Vol. 27, No. 3 (2007): pp. 267-292.
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different types of plausible argument which, when successfully deployed, create
presumptions in favor of their conclusions and thereby shift the burden of proof to
an objector. Associated with each argumentation scheme is a set of critical questions
to be used in the evaluation of arguments of the corresponding type. The posing of
a critical question has the effect of defeating the initial presumption and shifting
the burden of proof back on to the initial proponent.
In recent years, the literature on argumentation schemes has experienced a
growth spurt and, despite the considerable theoretical and technical advances being
made, we presently stand in danger of losing any cohesion that might have existed
in the treatment of this important topic in argumentation. Yet, these advances have
also demonstrated that changes in the existing accounts of argumentation schemes
may be not only desirable but required.
The pressure for change has principally come from two directions. In applied
argumentation theory (particularly in the field of artificial intelligence) various
competing models of schemes and their accompanying critical questions are being
developed and implemented, prompting important questions about how critical
questions should be represented in argument diagrams. We leave this important
topic for another occasion.
In the theoretically oriented literature several questions and criticisms have
been posed that stand in need of resolution. Significantly, Blair (2001) has put a
number of points on the theoretical agenda. These include:
(i) the ultimate nature of argumentation schemes: Are schemes
descriptive or prescriptive? What do schemes represent, patterns of
reasoning or types of argument?
(ii) the proper classification of schemes: How general should the schemes
be? How should they be distinguished and classified?
(iii) the foundation of argumentation schemes: If normative, what is the
grounding of their normativity? How do presumptive schemes relate
to other forms of reasoning.
(iv) the evaluation of schematic arguments: What is the role of critical
questions in the evaluation of schematic arguments? How should the
correct number and kind of critical questions accompanying a scheme
be determined?3
Also, Pinto (2001a, 2001b, 2003) has raised several important challenges to the
standard picture of argumentation schemes. Specifically, Pinto challenges the idea
that schemes are especially useful in argument reconstruction (2003), and that
they should be seen as normative (2001a, 2001b) because not all bona fide instances
of argumentation schemes effectively create presumptions in favor of their
conclusions. Similarly, Pinto (2003) challenges the standard account of the role of
critical questions, arguing that they do not always have the argumentative force
standardly accorded to them of shifting the burden of proof back to a proponent.
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The purpose of this paper is to bring some of these divergent views into dialogue
with one another, and to determine what progress can be made in the theory of
argumentation schemes in light of recent developments. Specifically, we propose
solutions to several theoretical problems surrounding argumentation schemes. We
maintain that argumentation schemes are normative structures of plausible reasoning
that have an important role in both argument reconstruction and argument
evaluation. We argue that the critical questions associated with a scheme should be
a function of two factors: their function and their foundation. The normative, or
theoretical, foundation of critical questions as tools for the evaluation of schematic
arguments is that they test one (or more) of the three aspects of argument cogency:
relevance, acceptability and sufficiency [R.S.A.]. The function of a critical question
is to test a typical or common way in which an argument of a certain schematictype can fail to meet one (or more) of the R.S.A. criteria. Thus, critical questions
are a kind of evaluative topoi, providing a list of individually necessary conditions
for the success of particular schematic arguments. On the other hand, because
they represent only commonplace ways in which arguments of some schematictype can default, they are not jointly sufficient conditions for the success of a
schematic argument. While do not seek to resolve every question surrounding
argumentation schemes and critical questions, we hope that the paper will contribute
to a working-through of Blair’s theoretical agenda, and provide at least provisional
answers to some of Pinto’s critical points.

2. Classification of schemes
Questions concerning the correct typology of argumentation schemes are pressing
because typologies are proliferating—sometimes without any reference to existing
typologies—and this development is one of the causes of the fragmentation in the
literature. Historically, different typologies can be found in the classical works of
Rhetoric to Alexander (cf. Braet, 2004), Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian and Boethius,
and the medieval works of Peter of Spain, Abaelard and William of Ockham (cf.
Kienpointner, 1987, pp. 280-284). More recently, typologies have been given by
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Hastings (1963) and Kienpointner (1992).
Several existing typologies are predominant in the literature today. The PragmaDialectical school recognizes three schemes corresponding to three basic relations
that can obtain between premises and conclusions: a symptomatic relation (e.g.,
argument from sign), a relation of comparison (e.g., argument by analogy), and a
causal relation (e.g., causal argument and means-end argumentation) (Garssen
2001, pp. 91-92; cf. van Eemeren and Kruiger, 1987, pp. 73-74; van Eemeren and
Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 98-99). Situating himself in the tradition that begins with
Aristotle’s Topics and runs through Hastings (1963) and Kienpointner (1992), Walton
(1996) recognizes a wide array of schemes corresponding to common patterns of
reasoning employed in everyday argumentation such as argument from sign,
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argument from example, argument from position to know, argument from expert
opinion, argument from cause to effect, argument from analogy, argument from
precedent, etc. More recently, Katzav and Reed (2004a, 2004b) have developed a
typology based upon different relations of conveyance, examples of which include
the relations of genus to species, sameness of meaning, implication, conserved
quantity, and singular cause to effect. Since relations of conveyance represent
warrants (Katzav and Reed, 2004a, p. 5), such an approach amounts to classifying
arguments according to the type of warrant involved in the argument.4
Given this multitude of typologies, it seems that we require some general set of
principles by which to enumerate and classify argumentation schemes. From a
purely theoretical point of view, we agree with Garssen (1994, pp. 106-107) that
a minimal set of exhaustive, mutually exclusive schemes is desirable, and that the
categories required will be a function of the purposes of classification. Walton and
Reed (2003, p. 196) propose that a typology should be rich enough to encompass
a significant portion of everyday argument types, simple enough to be effectively
taught and usefully applied in analysis, fine-grained enough to be effective as an
evaluative tool, rigorous enough to be implemented in automated models and clear
enough to be integrated into traditional diagramming techniques. We also feel that
a typology should reflect distinctions among arguments made at an intuitive,
common-sense, or pre-theoretic level by everyday arguers.
Perhaps the most developed solution to the classification question has been
provided by Blair (2000) who holds that schemes are reason-types and can be
individuated by the types of reasons employed in patterns of reasoning. “A scheme
will be the scheme of a reason, and a reason is the smallest self-standing unit of
support for a position.” Descriptive schemes provide accurate representations of
patterns of reasoning commonly employed by reasoners, even though these
reasonings may not be cogent. (Thus fallacies are descriptive reasoning schemes
on Blair’s account, but instead of being characteristically good they are
characteristically bad). Conceiving of schemes as reason-types does not entirely
determine the level of abstractness or specificity at which the reasoning should be
represented. On Blair’s account, the warrant employed in the reasoning determines
the level of specificity of a scheme: “a scheme must represent the particular warrant
of the reasoning: the properties of the reasoning that are salient to its (alleged)
cogency.” Thus Blair’s account agrees with that of Katzav and Reed (2004a) in
that schemes can be distinguished according to their warrant or “relation of
conveyance.” Cogent schemes “portray patterns of reasons which can have
instantiations that are cogent,” and can thereby be said to represent normative
categories of reasoning.
In our view, what is most important is that the aims of classification will
determine the relevant classificatory categories. This means that a multitude of
different typologies need not compete with one another and thereby pose a problem
for a general theory, so long as the different systems serve different ends. In this
respect, we agree with Blair’s (2000) conclusion that “[s]ystems of classification
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are relative to their purposes. Consequently, there can be no ‘correct’ typology of
reasoning schemes. The only pertinent question is whether any particular
classification successfully or optimally fulfills its purpose.” By the same token, a
central aim of each classification system is to aid in the structural analysis and
evaluation of reasoning and argument. Thus, to whatever extent schemes can
provide generalizable answers to the questions of how a particular piece of reasoning
works (or is supposed to work), and whether it actually works, schematic
classification will be a useful tool to theorists and arguers. The workings of a piece
of reasoning are explained by the premises and warrant at work in the reasoning,
and it is these features which ultimately provide a piece of reasoning with its
rational and evidentiary structure.

3. The reconstructive role of argumentation schemes
Standardly, argumentation schemes have been assigned a role in the analytical
reconstruction of argumentation, as well as its evaluation. In reconstruction it is
thought that, by providing paradigms of certain common types of reasoning,
argumentation schemes can be used to identify and categorize instances and can
thereby help guide the analyst when identifying implicit claims and filling in the
gaps in the reasoning of everyday arguers.
This view is challenged by Pinto (2003). By critically analysing an example
offered by Walton and Reed (2003) Pinto claims that “we’re able to identify applicable
schemes only because we’ve already identified implicit premises and an unstated
intermediate conclusion. Application of the schemes seems to be to be a
consequence, and not a cause, or reconstructing the argument [in a particular
way].”
To a point, Pinto is right here. Identifying an argument as being an instance of
a particular scheme cannot rely solely on the scheme itself. Instead, the descriptive
accuracy of reconstruction will be established by situational as well as textual and
contextual features of the argument. Indeed, if Godden (2005) is correct,
descriptively accurate reconstructions may well involve knowledge of, or rely on
postulations regarding, facts about arguers themselves such as their goals, or
intentions. Further, schematic classification of an argument instance might easily
require supplying some missing or unstated components of the argument. Clearly,
if the schemes have a role to play in reconstruction, it cannot be this.
Yet, this is not to say that the schemes have no role to play whatsoever. Insofar
as the schemes actually do capture types of argument commonly employed in
everyday argumentation, a worthwhile interpretative strategy is to determine whether
there are grounds (explicit, contextual, or situational) for thinking that the
argumentative strategy being employed on some occasion is to offer an argument
of some common type. Clearly, some kind of preliminary analysis is involved in
classifying instances of argumentation according to schematic structure. The
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schematic categorization of an argument need not involve supplementing it with
unexpressed claims. Instead, schematic classification can be based on expressed
premises indicating an enthymematic statement of an argument of a certain type,
as well as relying on textual cues (such as indicator phrases), and contextual and
situational information. These same factors might also justify supplementing the
argument with unexpressed claims. While these claims might form parts of argument
schemes, their addition at this stage does not depend on the classification of the
argument as being an instance of that scheme. The role of a scheme at this stage
of analysis is not to supply missing material to an argument, but to serve as a
model for comparison. It is by comparing the argumentative material presented in
a case with the known schemes that an argument can be classified as an instance
of a certain scheme. The schematic identification of an argument, then, is a kind
of interpretative, or hermeneutic, hypothesis which must always be checked against
available information throughout the processes of analysis and evaluation.
Once an argument is identified as being an instance of a particular type, the
schemes can play a significant role not only in the evaluation of that argument, but
also in subsequent stages of its reconstruction. Insofar as the schemes capture all
and only those premises and warrants involved in some particular type of reasoning,
then the knowledge that a particular argument aims to embody an inference of that
type contributes significantly to the structural analysis of that argument. Thus, if
an instance of argumentation embodies some of the features of a particular scheme,
that can give the analyst enough cause to see whether other aspects of the scheme
can justifiably be used to describe the particular instance under consideration. In
this way, knowledge of the schemes can help to rule out particular reconstructions
as well. For example, if it is determined that some feature of the scheme cannot
reasonably be used to describe some particular instance under reconstruction (e.g.,
there is evidence that the arguer would reject commitment to it), then that provides
grounds for thinking that the arguer might have been using some other argumentative
strategy. Alternately, the author of the argument under analysis might be deliberately
misusing it, or failing to correctly deploy it, as an instance of some scheme. That
is, she might not understand, or might wish to avoid, her commitment to claims
involved in the proper use of arguments having this scheme. Thus, even if the
claims identified in the scheme are not properly attributable to the author of the
argument under analysis, the schematic classification of an argument will aid the
analyst and critic in determining on what the structural integrity and argumentative
success of such an argument depends. So, in the project of analysis, argument
schemes serve as models of comparison during the initial identification of the type
of reasoning at work in an argument, and further provide a complete profile of all
the required components of the argument once such an identification is made.
Finally, we note in passing that argumentation schemes also can play an important
role in argument invention (or the generation and composition of argument) (Walton
2005a).
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4. Nature and normativity of argumentation schemes
Another central question in the theory of argumentation schemes concerns whether
they are primarily normative or descriptive in nature. We take it as obvious that the
schemes can be descriptive of at least some instances of reasoning, and questions
regarding the frequency with which such schemes are employed in everyday
argument is an empirical one which will not be addressed here (see Hitchcock,
2001). Above, we have shown the role that schemes can have in the primarily
descriptive project of argument reconstruction. On the standard account,
argumentation schemes are also normative, in that schematic arguments provide
at least provisional support for their conclusions. Walton (1996, p. x) has described
the nature of this normativity as a kind of ‘binding’ on arguers capable of creating
rational and discursive obligations: “If the hearer accepts the premises of the
speaker’s argument, and the argument is an instance of a genuine and appropriate
argument scheme (for the type of dialogue they are engaged in), then the hearer
must or should (in some binding way) accept the conclusion [at least provisionally].”
Yet, a satisfactory explanation of the source of the normativity of schematic
arguments is more difficult to come by. Justifying schematic arguments is an
important task because, until recently, many common but defeasible forms of
argument were identified as fallacious. Yet it has been shown that, in many instances,
arguments of these types are not fallacious but instead provide provisional support
for their conclusions. A completely systematic justification of defeasible schematic
arguments is ruled out by their non-monotonicity and the situational determination
of their acceptability (Blair, 1999, p. 56; Pinto, 2001b, p. 111). Hence, Walton
(2005b) has argued that schematic arguments require not only a systematic but
also a pragmatic justification. Walton writes: “The pragmatic dimension requires
that such arguments need to be examined within the context of an ongoing
investigation of dialogue in which questions are being asked and answered” (2005b,
p.8). Thus critical questions play an integral role in the evaluation of individual
schematic arguments, and because of this they also function in the overall
justification of argumentation schemes.
Yet, even when this is accepted, the issue of whether the argumentation schemes
represent “patterns of good reasoning” (Blair, 2000, emphasis added) remains
open to question (Pinto, 2001a; 2001b). Perhaps the most developed answer to
this question is provided by Blair (2001, p. 376) and is worth quoting at length.
Blair writes:
What is the source of the probative force of a ‘valid’ inference or argument
using such a scheme? The short explanation, I take it, lies in the irrationality
of accepting the premises but rejecting the conclusion of such an inference
or argument in those particular circumstances. … In the case of deductive
validity, the reasoning or arguing derives its normative force or cogency
from the fact that the truth of the premises of such a scheme on that occasion
guarantees the truth of the conclusion. Thus, to accept the premises, and yet
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to refuse to accept the conclusion, is irrational by virtue of being strongly
inconsistent. …
In the case of presumptively cogent reasoning or argument, it is plausible to
understand the probative force of the scheme in question in those
circumstances in a similar fashion. The reasoning or argument derives its
cogency from the fact that to accept the premises and grant the validity of
the inference using that scheme yet deny the plausibility of the conclusion,
under the circumstances—without suggesting that any conditions of rebuttal
exist—is pragmatically inconsistent. Given a strong presumption, to refuse
to accept the conclusion without denying the evidence or finding a rebutting
condition implies believing that there is some rebutting condition or
circumstance for which there is no evidence. The skeptic in such a case is
holding that the less plausible is the more plausible.

We find that Blair’s explanation contributes significantly to an understanding of the
schemes as normative patterns of reasoning and structures of argument. Yet, this
account does not specifically address the challenges raised by Pinto. In the
remainder of the section we consider and attempt to answer these concerns.

4.1 Pinto’s argument against the normativity of argumentation
schemes
The view that schemes are normative in nature has been challenged by Pinto
(2001a, 2001b). Pinto argues that, since not every instance of a recognized argument
scheme should be presumed to be a good presumptive argument – even accepting
that good presumptive arguments can be defeated in special circumstances – we
should conclude that argument schemes are not themselves normative (Pinto,
2001a, p. 101). Pinto’s reasoning goes like this: schematic arguments can fail for
at least two categorically different kinds of reasons.
(a) Schematic arguments can fail because the inference involved is itself
somehow defective—that is, the information presented within the
argument itself is somehow unable to establish a presumption in
favor of its conclusion.
(b) Schematic arguments can fail because of other considerations beyond
the argument itself—that is, because new information external to
the argument itself somehow defeats the inference at work in the
original schematic argument.
Of the first kind of problem, Pinto lists the unacceptability of one or more of the
premises, and a variety of reasons whereby the warrant (or unexpressed
generalization at work in the inference) might be challenged. A schematic argument
having problems of this type suffers from some internal defect; it fails to create a
presumption in favor of its conclusion, and thereby fails to shift the burden of
proof to an objector. Importantly, as Pinto recognizes, problems of this first type
are not specific to non-deductive arguments.5
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Of the second kind of problem, Pinto (2001a, pp. 102-103; emphasis removed)
lists underminers (“additional facts that undermine the inference [at work in the
schematic argument]”) and overriders (“additional evidence that overrides the
inference in question, by supporting the negation of its conclusion”).6 A schematic
argument having problems of this second type might initially create a presumption
in favor if its conclusion, but subsequently default when new information that
somehow defeats the initial inference comes to light. Clearly, the second set of
problems relates to the non-monotonic nature of schematic arguments.
It is their susceptibility to problems of the first sort that prevent argumentation
schemes from marking normative categories of argument. Pinto’s claim is that,
since some schematic arguments can have problems of the first sort, these
arguments will fail to initially establish presumptions in favor of their conclusions,
despite their being an instance of some recognized scheme. Because not all schematic
arguments successfully establish presumptions in favor of their conclusions, the
schemes themselves should not be viewed as normative categories of argument
(2001a, pp. 103-104; cf. 2001b, pp. 109-111). Instead, Pinto (2001b, p. 111)
argues that
the normative force and authority of any particular type of evidence or
argument doesn’t derive from the fact that it exemplifies a recognized
‘normative’ argument scheme. Its normative force is grounded in pragmatic
considerations of the sort … that would justify the use of this sort of evidence
in this sort of context to settle this sort of question. The schemes can’t be
what provide the validation of presumptive reasoning, because the use of a
particular scheme on a particular occasion itself always stands in need of
validation or justification.

For Pinto, the theoretical value of argumentation schemes does not arise from the
mistaken view that they are normative in nature, but comes instead from their
association with a set of critical questions which can guide a respondent in evaluating
a schematic argument. On Pinto’s (2001a, p. 104) view, “it isn’t the schemes that
do the evaluative work, it’s we who do the evaluative work.”

4.2 A response to Pinto’s argument
While we agree with Pinto’s analysis that schematic arguments having the first
kind of defect fail to create presumptions in favor of their conclusions and fail to
shift the burden of proof to their objectors, we disagree that argumentation schemes
thereby fail to be normative categories of argument. In the first place, a consequence
of Pinto’s argument is that deductively valid argument forms should not be seen as
normative either.7 Since arguments that are instances of deductively valid forms
can also have problems of type (a) (they can have false premises or rely on a
warrant that is circular), not all instances of valid argument forms will successfully
establish, or provide good reasons for, the truth of their conclusions. Since the
normativity of argument schemes and valid argument forms stand or fall together
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on Pinto’s argument, argumentation schemes can remain “formal pragmatic
structure[s] that … [are] the counterpart[s] to logical forms of inference in
semantics” (Walton, 1996, p. x; cited in Pinto, 2001a, p. 100) despite Pinto’s
criticisms.
We feel that it is important to retain a conception of both schematic arguments
and instances of valid argument forms as normative categories of argument. The
second category marks a class of arguments having no counter-example, and
whose warrants are truth-preserving. This is an important standard of evidence
(Godden, 2005) which, though it may not be appropriate to all argumentative
circumstances, is worthy of distinction as a standard which arguments can either
meet or fail to meet. Similarly, the category of schematic arguments marks a class
of arguments having no known counter-example (relative to some information
state), and whose warrants are presumption-establishing in normal circumstances
and in the absence of defeating evidence or countervailing considerations. This too
is an important standard of evidence which, though it may not be appropriate to all
argumentative circumstances, is worthy of distinction as a standard which arguments
can either meet or fail to meet. Neither category is exhaustive of arguments meeting
their associated standard, yet all arguments belonging to these categories meet the
corresponding standard of evidence.
We agree with Pinto (2001b, p. 111) that the application of a particular standard
of evidence as an evaluative standard for some argument on a particular occasion
itself stands in need of justification, that this justification will involve pragmatic
considerations, and that as a result the evaluation of argument, and the normative
(i.e., probative or persuasive) force of arguments deployed in particular
circumstances cannot be determined by the form or scheme of the argument
alone. Indeed, in our view, the evaluation of situated argument is best approached
dialectically. But these considerations are independent of the claim that standards
of evidence constitute normative standards. As such, arguments meeting particular
standards of evidence have normative properties.
Perhaps the best way to think about argument schemes is to think of them as
the counterparts to informal fallacies. While not every instance of a fallacious type
of argument is itself fallacious (there can be legitimate and acceptable employments
of argumentum ad hominem for instance), not every instance of an argument
scheme is a good presumptive argument. Nevertheless, argument schemes represent
a species of argument that are standardly capable of presumptively establishing
their conclusions, if only in a defeasible way.

5. Evaluation of Schematic Arguments
Schemes are also normative in the sense that instances of a given scheme can be
evaluated using similar measures, namely the critical questions. By instantiating a
stereotypical pattern of reasoning, schematic arguments are subject to stereotypical
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errors of reasoning that can be associated with them. Because of this, they can be
evaluated with questions general to arguments of their schematic-type.
The argumentative role of critical questions is explained in relation to
argumentation schemes. To each scheme a certain number of critical questions
are attached. These questions have a role in the evaluation of arguments with the
relevant scheme, but their precise function and foundation have not been agreed
upon. Originally, the critical questions evolved as did the schemes themselves, and
they seemed to have a heuristic—even pedagogical—role, acting as a guide for
arguers in their evaluation of arguments of certain recognizable types. Given that
the schemes represented stereotypical patterns of reasoning used in commonplace,
defeasible arguments, it intuitively seemed that the critical questions accompanying
a scheme should capture the stereotypical kinds of errors or defeaters that might
pertain to reasoning of that type. Yet, Blair (2001, p. 370) has recently challenged
this heuristic course of development of critical questions by asking for a more
rigorous and definitive specification of the correct number and kind of critical
questions to be associated with each argumentation scheme.

5.1 Theoretical foundations of critical questions
It is our position that the critical questions associated with a scheme should be
a function of two factors: their function and their foundation. The general function
of critical questions is to assist in the evaluation of reasoning of a specifiable type.
If critical questions are to have this role, they must be founded in the general
principles of the evaluation of inferences and arguments.
A standard theory of argument evaluation for informal logic and argumentation
theory claims that an argument is cogent if and only if (i) its premises are rationally
acceptable, (ii) its premises are relevant to its conclusion and (iii) its premises
provide sufficient reason to accept the conclusion.8 (Following Johnson and Blair
we will call this the R.S.A. test for argument cogency.) These three criteria are
sometimes augmented with a fourth criterion: (iv) that there are no known better
reasons for an opposite conclusion, which we here treat as an aspect of sufficiency.9
These criteria combine to test the adequacy of premises and the link between
premises and conclusion. Searches for underminers (undercutting defeaters) and
overriders (rebutting defeaters) can be seen as applications of the sufficiency
criterion of cogency, the latter of which explicitly tests condition (iv).
Our thesis is that the normative theory informing the critical questions approach
to the evaluation of schematic arguments is not opposed to—but rather derives
from—the R.S.A. standard of argument cogency. Critical questions are not supplied
as an alternative to the R.S.A. standard; rather they are best seen as an application
of it to arguments of particular types—arguments that involve distinctive patterns
of reasoning—deployed in unique dialectical circumstances. Thus, the legitimacy
of a critical question derives from the fact that it tests some aspect of its target
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argument against one of the R.S.A criteria. Questions are scheme-specific because
they address some general way in which arguments of some particular schematic
type can fail to meet the R.S.A. standard. Such an account agrees with Blair’s
(2000, p. 25) thesis that “the critical questions associated with a reasoning scheme
are generated by knowledge of the types of circumstances in which there are
exceptions to what is normally good reasoning.”
Consider, for instance, the argument from expert opinion (Walton 2002, pp.
49-50; 1997b, 211-225).
Argument from expert opinion
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing
proposition A.
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false).
Conclusion: A is true (false).
Critical questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?
Field Question: Is E an expert in the field that A is in?
Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?
Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?
Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
Backup Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on evidence?

Each of these critical questions tests some component of the R.S.A. criteria. The
expertise question tests the sufficiency condition of the inferential strength between
premise and conclusion by asking whether an undermining condition applies. In
this case, issues of bias or lack of credibility would give reason to doubt the
accuracy of E’s testimony despite her being an expert in the relevant subject field
S. The field question raises issue with the acceptability of the major premise in the
inference. An obvious way that this type of premise could fail is that the supposed
expert is either unqualified, or is only qualified in some unrelated field of knowledge.
In some versions of the scheme from expert opinion, where the domain of expertise
is not explicitly stated in the major premise, the field question would challenge the
relevance of the premise, and raises a point that could potentially undermine the
inference. The opinion question challenges that acceptability of the minor premise.
Similarly to the credibility question, the trustworthiness question also tests the
sufficiency condition by raising an issue that could potentially undermine the
inference. If the expert’s reliability can be called into question, this would give
some reason to doubt the accuracy of her testimony despite her expertise in the
field. The consistency question tests the overall sufficiency of the inference by
raising an issue that could both override and undermine it. If the testimony of the
selected expert does not concur with the prevailing opinion of other experts in the
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field then (i) the reliability of the expert’s testimony could be called into doubt
thereby undermining the inference, and (ii) the contrary opinions of other experts
could provide good grounds for an opposite conclusion thereby overriding the
inference. Finally, the backup evidence question challenges the sufficiency of the
inference. Roughly, it is checking to see whether there is a rational basis for the
expert’s opinion in this case—whether the expert has specifically looked into the
matter at issue, or whether she is simply ‘giving an opinion’. The absence of an
adequate rational basis for the expert’s opinion would potentially undermine the
inference.
We have seen, then, that the critical questions applying to the argument scheme
from expert opinion all serve to raise issue with some aspect of the cogency of
such arguments under the R.S.A. standard. Accepting that the foundation of the
critical questions is to be found in the fact that they each test some element of the
R.S.A. cogency criteria, it might be argued that there is no need for any additional
evaluative tools such as critical questions, and that they should be dispensed with
entirely. After all, any argument that passes the R.S.A. test will be a good argument.
(NB: This would equally well justify dispensing with the schemes entirely as well.)
In spite of this, we still feel that critical questions have an important role in the
dialectical evaluation of schematic arguments. As we said above, we hold that the
critical questions associated with a scheme should be determined by two factors:
their foundation and function. Having established their theoretical well-foundedness,
the question of whether critical questions should be employed as tools of argument
evaluation becomes a utilitarian one. We feel that the unique function of critical
questions justifies their continued usage as distinct set of evaluative tools.
Since argumentation schemes are stereotypical pattern of defeasible reasoning,
schematic arguments are subject to stereotypical errors of reasoning that can be
associated with them. That is, there may be typical, or common ways in which the
R.S.A. cogency conditions could apply to arguments of a given schematic type
that would not typically apply to other common types of argument. Blair (1999, p.
56) described the function of critical questions as evaluative tools in this way:
the role of … [critical questions] is to remind its user of the types of
circumstances that typically derail reasoning of the pattern represented by
the scheme. The critical questions function as a check-list to help determine
whether any of the standard types of excepting conditions that should cancel
the default represented by the scheme are presented in that particular instance
of its employment.

We note in passing that taking this approach towards the provenance of critical
questions helps to supply an answer to Blair’s question concerning the correct
number and kind of critical questions that apply to some given scheme. But more
to the point, we hold that this account of the function of critical questions (which
we take to roughly coincide with that of Pinto, discussed below) gives them a
unique and important role in the dialectical evaluation of plausible argument.
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6. The Evaluative Role of Critical Questions
While critical questions clearly function in the evaluation of schematic arguments,
their exact role is unclear, especially in the context of an argumentative dialogue.
Sometimes critical questions are described as if they were necessary conditions
for the acceptability of any schematic argument. Blair, for instance, writes that
critical questions “are questions that must be answered appropriately if any
substitution instance of a reasoning scheme is to be cogent” (Blair, 2000). At other
times, critical questions are said to function “like a traditional topic as a memory
device” “offer[ing] the user … a choice among strategies for probing into the
weak points in an argument” (Walton and Reed, 2003, p. 202).10 Which description
more accurately portrays their actual role in the evaluation of argument?
Walton (1996) conceived of the questions as pedagogical tools, with a heuristic
role in the dialectical evaluation of argument (Walton, 2003, p. 31). So conceived,
critical questions play the second role more than the first. On the other hand, the
effect of raising a critical question is to temporarily defeat the target argument, at
least until the question has been satisfactorily answered. So, at the very least, it is
a necessary condition for the acceptability of a schematic argument that all questions
posed be satisfactorily answered.
Yet this is only a partial answer to the question of the actual role of critical
questions in the evaluation of schematic arguments. Is the answering of all critical
questions posed a sufficient condition for acceptability? Is it necessary that critical
questions be posed at all?

6.1 Is there a burden of questioning?
Let us consider the second question first. Is it incumbent on arguers presented
with schematic arguments to pose the relevant critical questions?11 If critical
questions give acceptability criteria for schematic arguments, then it would seem
that there is a burden upon respondents to pose critical questions of schematic
arguments before accepting their conclusions. Similarly, if one is not willing to
accept or concede a standpoint at issue, it would seem that there is some obligation
to raise objections to any supporting argument. On the other hand, if questions are
simply heuristic devices designed to help critics find objections, then it is perhaps
not necessary that they be asked as part of the evaluation of schematic arguments.
So, part of the answer concerning whether there is a burden of questioning is
given by the nature of critical questions themselves.
Several points bear on the answer to this question. First, once critical questions
have been posed, it is incumbent on the proponent to satisfactorily respond to
those critical questions in order to preserve the acceptability of her argument. So,
it is a necessary condition of argument acceptability that, in principle, the critical
questions could be answered, if posed. In practice, though, this requirement will
be counterbalanced by several more practical considerations.
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First, the rules governing commitment and retraction will have a bearing on the
decision to raise questions. Some frameworks of dialogue (law, for example) operate
with a notion of inference whereby an inference permits, rather than requires, the
drawing of a conclusion from certain premises.12 In dialogues with a permissive
notion of inference, dialogue participants are not obliged to accept a claim that has
been argued for by an opponent, even though that argument provides some support
for the claim and the argument itself has passed without challenge. Under these
sorts of conditions it may not be necessary to question, or otherwise object to, an
argument even though one is unwilling to accept its conclusion. Similarly,
considerations such as whether, and under what conditions, a respondent is able
to retract his commitment to a claim once it has been admitted into a dialogue will
certainly have a bearing on whether, and to what extent, a respondent ought to
raise questions about any given argument.
In addition to these factors, there will be practical considerations such as whether
it is better just to press ahead with the dialogue and return to the critical questions
only if it is deemed necessary or important at a later stage. Further, there will be
strategic considerations that will help to determine whether critical questions ought
to be raised. Such considerations might include: the significance of the particular
claim at issue in the overall context of the dialogue and the mass of evidence
involved, or whether there is a better way of objecting to the schematic argument,
for instance by providing a stronger argument for an opposing claim.
In any real situation, then, the issues guiding critical questioning will be informed
by a number of considerations, practical as well as strategic. So, there is a sense in
which critical questions do provide necessary criteria for the acceptability of
schematic arguments. But, it is not a necessary condition of every schematic
argument that it in fact answer each associated critical question in order that its
conclusion be accepted.

6.2 Do critical questions provide sufficient criteria for acceptability?
Let us now turn to the question of whether the critical questions give sufficient
conditions for the acceptability of schematic arguments. Several factors have a
bearing on the answer to this question. One of the problems involved in the evaluation
of defeasible argumentation schemes is the problem of completeness (Walton,
2001, pp. 159-160; Walton and Reed, 2003, p. 203). Is the evaluation of an
argumentation scheme ever sufficiently complete so that its conclusion should be
accepted? And if so, when?
A first point to consider is that the schemes under consideration are nonmonotonic. That is, the probative weight provided to a conclusion by the reasons
is always subject to defeat in light of new information. In view of this, the answer
to the completeness problem seems to be that the evaluation of any defeasible
argumentation scheme can never be closed in any final sense, but can only be
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closed in some local context, in relation to some specified body of information.
Within the global context in which it may be subject to new information which
might bring about its default, a defeasible argument provides some, though not
conclusive, evidence in support of its conclusion. In the absence of any reasons to
the contrary, these reasons provide sufficient grounds for the provisional acceptance
of the conclusion. As a result, the argumentative effect of this type of argument is
to shift the burden of proof to any objector. It is for this reason that Walton
described argumentation schemes as presumptive in nature (1996; forthcoming).
Their effect is to create a presumption in favour of their conclusions.
A second aspect of the problem is whether the critical questions alone provide
sufficient criteria within this more limited context, i.e. for the provisional acceptance
of a conclusion, relative to a fixed body of information. The answer here seems to
be that, while the questions contribute to the assessment of schematic arguments,
they are not exhaustive of it. Critical questions apply the R.S.A. cogency criteria in
which they are theoretically grounded, but they do not constitute a comprehensive
application of them. Instead, their function is to capture a set of typical ways in
which arguments of a particular schematic-type might fail to meet the R.S.A.
criteria. As such, even if all critical questions are satisfactorily answered there may
be other factors affecting the cogency of a particular schematic argument, or the
acceptability of its conclusion. Ultimately, as Walton has argued (forthcoming)
“[t]he solution to the completeness problem is that … [schematic arguments]
should never be regarded as complete and closed to further questioning, until the
dialogue itself has been closed. Only at that point is all the relevant evidence on
both sides of the issue weighed up.”

6.3 The completeness problem
Another dimension to the completeness problem can be framed in terms of the
asking of critical questions themselves (Walton, 2001, pp. 159-160; Walton and
Reed, 2003, p. 203). That is, in the context of a dialogue, when, if ever, is a
respondent obliged to stop asking critical questions of an argument and concede
the standpoint at issue? Should there be a procedural rule that puts an end to the
process of critical questioning, and if so, what should determine that point?13
Part of the answer to this question depends on whether the critical question
has been satisfactorily answered. If ever a question cannot be satisfactorily
answered, then the questioning can be halted, because the target argument will
have been diffused. But, to get a more theoretically robust answer to the
completeness problem, it is worthwhile to consider some of the other argumentative
features of critical questions. Suppose that a question has been given a preliminary
answer. Can the questioning proceed with sub-questions, or with different questions?
Here again the answer seems to be dialectical (Walton, forthcoming), and will
ultimately be explained in terms of the burden of proof (Walton, 1988).
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In these terms, the question of completeness is linked to the issue of whether
there is a burden attached to posing critical questions. If we are right on this point,
then the ultimate answer to the completeness problem is that, for any specific
question and the argumentation which follows directly thereto (i.e., is devoted to
settling the matter of whether the question has been satisfactorily answered), the
questioning process (like the larger process of raising objections) halts whenever
a local burden of proof cannot be met.

7. Critical Questions and the Burden of Proof
In the end, the answer to the completeness problem must fall back on the notion of
burden of proof. There is a burden upon the proponent to satisfactorily answer all
critical questions relevant to the schematic argument posed by a respondent. There
may or may not be an obligation on the part of a respondent to raise, or to pose
such questions. But, in many cases, having received some response from the
proponent to the question, it will be incumbent on the respondent to show that the
answer is not adequate. That is, posing the question defeats the argument, until it
is satisfactorily answered. But, as Pinto (2003) has observed, in many cases, a
satisfactory answer to the critical question will not require the introduction of new
information, reasons or argument into the dialogue. In many cases, the answer
can be perfunctory, or the question might simply prompt a reflection on the part of
the proponent regarding the considerations made in reaching her standpoint. Yet,
answering the question is sufficient to restore the initial presumptive status of the
standpoint supported by the schematic argument, and shift the burden of proof
back to the opponent. The only condition under which this move fails is if the
answer is not satisfactory. But, we claim that it is the job of the questioner to show
this. The point is that, eventually, it will fall to the questioner, not the proponent, to
introduce new evidence into the dialogue. This accords with the argumentative
effects of presumptive arguments, which shift the burden of proof to the respondent.
It is not the job of the answerer (i.e., the proponent) to show that her answers
are satisfactory. Rather, the burden is on the questioner to show that an answer is
unsatisfactory. This raises the important question of whether there is a burden of
proof attached to questioning.

7.1 Is there a burden in questioning?
When the issue of critical questions was first discussed in the literature, the
prevailing view was that no burden of proof attached to asking critical questions.
It is commonly accepted that parties making assertions incur a burden of proof to
successfully defend their assertions with acceptable reasons, and that they bear an
obligation to retract those assertions that they cannot successfully defend. Yet,
such a burden is not commonly associated with asking questions. In the first
place, it was tacitly held that there was no burden on the part of a respondent to
pose any critical questions in the first place. And secondly, it was thought that “to
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ask an appropriate critical question in a dialogue shifts the burden of proof back
onto the side of the proponent of the original argument to reply to this question
successfully” (Walton, 1996, p. 15). Recent developments have challenged both
of these views.
As mentioned above, Walton (2003) has recently argued that there may be a
burden to question—that is to raise critical questions—in certain types of dialogues,
or in certain argumentative circumstances. In the second place, Pinto (2003)
challenged the standard view concerning the role of critical questions and their
effect on the burden of proof in schematic arguments, claiming that in many cases
the posing of critical questions by a respondent may not actually shift a burden of
proof back to a proponent. Subsequently, when trying to specify how critical
questions can be represented in models diagramming the structure of argument
schemes, it was proposed that certain critical questions might best be seen as
having a burden of proof attached to them (Walton and Reed, 2003; Prakken, Reed
and Walton, 2004). In what follows, we set forth this new approach to the role of
critical questions in argumentation schemes, and show how it addresses Pinto’s
concerns.
Prakken, Reed and Walton (2004), and Walton and Reed (2003) have argued
that, since different critical questions relate to their associated schematic arguments
in different ways, sometimes there is a burden of proof attached to raising a
critical question while in other cases there is not. For example, if a critical question
is addressed to some assumption at work in the argument as an implicit premise,
then there is no burden of proof attached to raising questions about the acceptability
of those assumptions. These critical questions seem to function normally,
automatically shifting the burden of proof back to the original proponent of the
argument, without themselves bringing any burden of proof back to the questioner.
On the other hand, some critical questions appear to instead raise allegations
against an argument. That is, in order that the questions have the critical force they
do, they themselves rest on some implicit claim which serves as an objection to
the argument. As a result, it would seem that some critical questions do not
automatically shift the burden of proof back to the proponent. Rather, some critical
questions seem to have a positive burden of proof attached. In summary, some
critical questions represent “additional assumptions of the argument … while others
function as staring points for finding rebuttals” (Walton and Reed, 2003, p. 208).
While the former have no burden of proof attached, the latter do.

7.2 Analysis of a sample scheme: Practical reasoning
Walton, Reed and Prakken based their conclusions on the analysis of the scheme
from expert opinion. To show how this new account might accommodate Pinto’s
(2003) criticisms of the standard one, we consider how this analysis applies to the
scheme of practical reasoning as given below (Walton, 1990b, p. 48; Walton 1997a,
p. 165).
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Practical Reasoning: Necessary Condition Schema
(N1) Goal Premise: My goal is to bring about A.
(N2) Alternatives Premise: I reasonably consider on the given information
that bringing about at least one of [B0,B1,...,Bn] is necessary to
bring about A.
(N3) Selection Premise: I have selected one member Bi as an acceptable,
or as the most acceptable necessary condition for A.
(N4) Practicality Premise: Nothing unchangeable prevents me from
bringing about Bi as far as I know.
(N5) Side Effects Premise: Bringing about A is more acceptable to me
than not bringing about Bi.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is required that I bring about Bi.
Critical questions
1. Alternative Means Question: Are there alternative means of realizing
A, other than B?
2. Acceptable/Best Option Possible Question: Is B an acceptable (or
the best) alternative?
3. Possibility Question: Is it possible for agent a to do B?
4. Negative Side Effects Question: Are there negative side effects of
a’s bringing about B that ought to be considered?
5. Conflicting Goals Question: Does a have the goals other than A,
which have the potential to conflict with a’s realizing A?
In the case of argument from expert opinion, whether there is a burden attached to
questioning can be determined according to whether the question acts to challenge
an implicit assumption or whether it serves as a starting point for objections. Let
us see whether this test applies to the scheme of practical reasoning introduced
above.
Here, it would seem that the test criteria cannot be applied in a clear-cut way.
In the first place, each critical question is clearly associated with some premise
explicitly stated in the argument. So, it would seem that none of the questions have
a burden attached to them.
This is correct to a point, since these questions can be posed in a relatively
innocuous manner, where they do not have a refuting or objecting function, but
simply serve to probe a bit further into the argument. As such, while the proponent
has a burden to answer each question asked, this burden can be met in a relatively
perfunctory way. For instance, as Pinto (2003) suggests, with the alternative means
question the proponent might respond simply by saying something like “No. I
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can’t think of any alternative means of realizing A other than those given in the list
of B” or “Well, those are all of the options I can think of. Can you think of any
others?” On the standard account, by responding to the question, the proponent
has met her burden, and the presumptive status of her original argument is restored.
We can see that, if the question is to serve as an objection in any further sense
something else must happen. Namely, it must be shown that the proponent’s answer
is unsatisfactory. Yet, as we have stated above, it is the responsibility of the respondent
to show this. In this case this would be done by finding examples of alternatives
not considered in the initial argument. Indeed, in the latter answer above, the
proponent explicitly shifts the burden of proof associated with the question back
upon the questioner by inviting him to come up with alternatives not initially
considered. Such alternatives would have the force of objections and would go
towards showing the unacceptability of the move from the alternatives premise to
the selection premise in the initial argument.
This reveals the second sense in which a question can be posed, namely as an
objection to the argument. Here, the question is asked in a rhetorical voice, whereby
a negative answer is implicit in the question. For example, in the alternative means
question, it is assumed that there actually is some alternative means that has not
been considered by the proponent in her initial argument. Yet, this implicit assertion
on the part of the respondent comes with a burden of proof attached. As such, if
the question is to serve as an objection in this stronger sense, there is some burden
in questioning.
In examining the practical reasoning scheme, it seems that each of the critical
questions can be posed either in a weak sense (as a means of probing further into
the argument) or in a strong sense (as a challenge, or objection to the argument).
Further, whether the question has a burden attached depends on how it is asked. If
it is asked in the weak sense, then it functions normally in shifting the burden of
proof back on the proponent. Importantly, this alone may be enough to diffuse the
initial argument if, for instance, the proponent realizes on reflection that there are
several options which she had not initially considered. On the other hand, if the
question is to go further and act as an objection then it has a positive burden of
proof attached to it. This can be explained in several ways. First, it is the dialectical
responsibility of the questioner to show that the proponent’s answers to the
questions are unsatisfactory. Second, in serving as an objection there will generally
be some implicit assertion at work in the question giving it its force as an objection.
Yet, assertions (even implicit ones) come with positive burdens of proof attached.
So, the issue of whether there is a burden of proof attached to questioning can
be explained in terms of how the question functions in the argument. Questions
which expose and challenge implicit assumptions in an argument, or simply seek
to probe a bit further into an argument do not come with any burden of proof
attached. But, questions which act as “starting points for finding rebuttals”, or as
rhetorical questions served to introduce an objection, come with a positive burden
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of proof attached. Thus, we agree with Pinto’s (2003) “other account” of critical
questions whereby
the function of critical questions is to guide a critic or respondent who is
looking for evidence that would cancel the force of the argument. The
“burden” of finding overriding or undermining evidence does not lie with the
proponent; it lies with the respondent. And the critical questions are signposts
pointing the respondent in directions where such evidence might lie.

It is crucial to recognize this as an important and common function of critical
questions which effectively changes the standard account of how they affect
burden of proof in argumentative dialogues. It remains the burden of a proponent
to satisfactorily answer all critical questions posed. But, when questions can be
answered in a perfunctory way, without making any new assertions, the burden of
showing that such answers are unsatisfactory will fall to the questioner (i.e.,
respondent), and it will be his job to introduce new and defeating evidence into the
dialogue. This effectively places a burden of proof on the questioner.
On the other hand, we hold that Pinto’s “other account” describes only one of
the functions that critical questions can have in an argumentative dialogue. As
such, we disagree with Pinto’s (2001b, p. 112) conclusion that “their function is
[solely] heuristic, and that the mere posing of such questions has no normative
force.” Sometimes, critical questions can function normally: they have no burden
of proof attached, and posing them temporarily defeats an argument (until they are
satisfactorily answered). Further, we disagree with Pinto’s (2003) conclusion
that “critical questions occur, not in the dialogue itself, but in the reasoning of a
respondent who is searching for a way to counter an argument made by a
proponent.” Even critical questions which serve as signposts for new and potentially
defeating counter-evidence can be meaningfully posed in a dialogue, and they
serve to map out a set of standard dialogic moves available to an arguer.

8. Conclusion
While we have by no means provided a comprehensive account of argumentation
schemes and critical questions, we have sought in this paper to propose a number
of solutions to some of the outstanding theoretical issues surrounding them. We
endorse Blair’s (2000) account of schemes as reason-types, whose purpose is to
represent structural patterns of defeasible reasoning commonly employed in
argument, and whose classification will depend to a significant extent on the
evidentiary structure the reasoning—the reason-types and the “relation of
conveyance” (Katzav and Reed, 2004a) at work in the inference. We further
endorse an account of argumentation schemes as normative categories of argument,
and sought to show how such a view can be maintained in the face of important
criticisms. We have demonstrated the reconstructive role of argumentation schemes,
and the evaluative role of critical questions. On the latter issue, we maintain that
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the questions associated with a scheme can be determined by their foundation and
their function. We have proposed an explanation of the theoretical foundation of
critical questions as evaluative tools: namely that they apply some element of the
R.S.A. standard of cogency. We maintain a standard account of the dialectical
function of critical questions and attempted to show how this account is partly
consistent with, and partly resists the criticisms of, Pinto’s “other account.” In
attempting to work through some Blair’s (2001) theoretical agenda , we hope to
have advanced the theory of schemes and critical questions by beginning to reconcile
a straightforwardly dialectical account of them with an account founded more
squarely in the informal logic approach. Ultimately, these approaches are not at
odds with one another, but share a common tradition, a common set of theoretical,
analytical and evaluative projects, and common views about the nature and
foundation of good argument.
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Notes
1

For a brief overview of the literature on argumentation schemes see Garssen 2001.
We agree with Blair (2000) that schemes represent patterns of reasoning or inference. Because
they can be used to classify types, or forms, of argument these schemes have come to be called
‘argumentation schemes’. We use the term ‘schematic argument’ to indicate a particular argument
whose structure can be represented as being an instance of a given argumentation scheme.
3
It should be noted that Blair himself (1999, 2000, 2001) has contributed significantly to the
resolution of some of these issues.
4
Katzav and Reed (2004a, p.5) write: “Premises represent conveying facts. Conclusions represent
conveyed facts. Warrants represent (often not explicitly) the relationship between the conveying
facts and the conveyed facts, and they usually have the form of conditionals. The classification of
2
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an argument … makes explicit which relation of conveyance the warrant represents.” Katzav and
Reed (2004a) actually provide a tree structure describing different types of relations of conveyance
each of which can be instantiated by several specific relations. For example, the conveyance
relation of implication is an instance of analyticity which is in turn a species of internal conveyance
relation.
5
We hold that terms such as “deductive” and “presumptive” indicate standards of evidence
against which arguments can be measured, not types of arguments. (They can also properly be
used to indicate classes of arguments meeting the relevant standard of evidence.) In this paper, the
terms are loosely used as if they named types of argument which, roughly, aim to meet the
relevant standard of evidence. We take the general sense of this usage to be familiar.
6
The names “underminers” and “overriders” are suggested by Pinto’s text, though he does not use
them himself. These faults appear similar to Pollock’s (1970) undercutting defeaters and rebutting
defeaters (Hitchcock, 2005).
7
This is a consequence Pinto seems willing to concede (implicitly on 2001a, p. 104, and explicitly
in 2001b, p. 110, fn. 20).
8
Johnson and Blair, (1994) call this the R.S.A. test, while Govier (2005, pp. 63-76) calls it the
A.R.G. (acceptability, relevance and good grounds) condition of argument cogency.
9
While (iv) can be seen as an element of (iii), it is often both pedagogically and theoretically
valuable to distinguish the two.
10
At times, Blair describes the role of critical questions with language similar to that used by
Walton and Reed, as for instance when he says that “[t]he critical questions function as a checklist to help determine whether any of the standard types of excepting conditions that should
cancel the default is present in the given case” (Blair, 2000).
11
This question has already been addressed by Walton (2003) in the context of legal argumentation.
12
In the context of a critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992) or a persuasion
dialogue (Walton and Krabbe, 1995) it is clear that a dialogue participant is rationally and dialectically
obliged to concede (i.e. accept) any conclusions reached in accordance with the rules governing the
dialogue. As such, should a dialogue participant be unwilling to make this concession, he is under
considerable obligation to raise objections to the argumentation by which that conclusion was
reached. In a permissive persuasion dialogue (Walton and Krabbe, 1995), where retraction is
possible the participant might be able meet this rational obligation by retracting some previous
commitment(s).
By contrast, in law, while disputants cannot ignore facts entered into evidence, they can ignore
arguments made by opposing council from those facts to other conclusions. The reason for this
is that the jury, or fact-finding body in the case, is permitted to draw conclusions from the facts
entered as evidence on the basis of their own best rational lights (rather than being required to
draw the conclusions proposed by the disputants).
13
This problem has also been addressed by Walton (forthcoming).
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